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## Viewing cable 06TELAVIV1083, JCG: ISRAEL NSC'S 2/23 SESSION WITH S/CT AMB.

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06TELAVIV1083	2006-03-17 14:47	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tel Aviv

Appears in these articles:

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 001083

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON AND JAKUB  
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER)  
TREASURY FOR PATRICK HEFFERNAN  
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER ANDERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PINR](#) [PINS](#) [ASEC](#) [IS](#) [COUNTERTERRORISM](#) [ISRAELI](#) [PALESTINIAN](#) [AFFAIRS](#) [GOI](#) [EXTERNAL](#)  
SUBJECT: JCG: ISRAEL NSC'S 2/23 SESSION WITH S/CT AMB.  
CRUMPTON

REF: TEL AVIV 922

Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

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SUMMARY

1. (C) On February 23, S/CT Coordinator Henry Crumpton was hosted by National Security Adviser Giora Eiland at Israel's NSC in Ramat HaSharon. (NOTE: The February 22 meeting of the U.S.-Israel Joint Counterterrorism Group is covered in refTel. END NOTE.) A panel discussion involving experts from Israel's NSC, MOD, DMI, ISA and INP covered lessons

Israel has learned from the Global War on Terror; Palestinian terrorist activity in Israel and suicide attacks; the Israeli National Police's approach to terrorism; lessons learned about terror finance, and discussion of the threat Hizballah poses to Lebanon and the region. The Israeli side made the following main points:

1A. Governments need to arm their counterterrorism services with the authority to act quickly to apprehend or kill individual terrorists, and the means to collect real-time intelligence and direct CT assets against mobile targets.

1B. The lesson Israel learned from the first Intifada was that it could not allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate freely in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The number of terrorist attacks, and their effectiveness, dropped dramatically after the IDF re-entered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

1C. The Palestinians can effectively use suicide attacks because there are plenty of young Palestinians willing to martyr themselves as bombers, and explosives are abundant and available to terrorist groups.

1D. Israel's various agencies responsible for counterterrorism cooperate and share information with one another much more effectively than they did five years ago. Israel has learned much about how terrorists transfer funds to one another, but still suffers from information gaps.

1E. Iran employs Hizballah as an arm with strategic reach that threatens the stability of Lebanon and the region, and international security.

12. (C) The two sides discussed the current status of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) and agreed that the program was an excellent example of U.S.-Israeli cooperation in the Global War on Terror. The participants then viewed a number of TSWG-produced equipment that is either currently in use, or will soon be available for USG and GOI use. END SUMMARY.

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OVERVIEW BY NSA EILAND  
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13. (C) National Security Adviser and retired Major General Giora Eiland opened the day's discussion with a review of some conclusions Israel has drawn about the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), cautioning that Israel "was a little late" in understanding the nature of the war and its implications. He made the following points:

1A. The War on Terror is Not a Conventional War. It happens among the people in populated areas. Individuals -- not armies -- are now our enemies. We now have to target specific people, not fixed military assets. Because people move quickly, we must have real-time intelligence. All forms of intelligence (e.g., signals, imagery, and human) need to be brought to one person at a very low level (e.g., a brigade commander), and that person must have the authority to make decisions regarding hitting targets. Because the enemy can move quickly and cause significant damage with the technology and know-how at his disposal, CT forces need to be able to react quickly. The rules of engagement are confusing when you do not know who the enemy is. International legal definitions are increasingly irrelevant.

1B. The Relationship Between the Political and Professional Levels Must Change. During World Wars I and II and the Cold War, the goals were simple and clear. In the GWOT, it is much more difficult to define military objectives. Military and political leaders need to discuss issues at the same level, because the issues now are neither purely political nor purely military. Not all responses should be military ones.

1C. Technology Needs to be Modified so that it is Appropriate for the War. Changing weapons systems is not easy from a psychological point of view. Now, 90 percent of capabilities for targeted killings are based on technology. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being used to find fixed targets, and can now locate specific people. In the past five-and-a-half years, Israel has faced many attempts to execute suicide attacks, but has prevented 80-90 percent of them, with technology being responsible for 90 percent of the successes.

1D. We Must Change How We Allocate Resources and Define Missions. The current set of CT organizations is conservative in how it behaves and how its component parts share information with one another. They were designed under old rules. A good example is how the Israeli National Police (INP) relates with the Israeli army (IDF). The war on terrorism means that the missions of these two organizations overlap now. Consequently, their missions and resources need to be adjusted. Israel believes that targeted killings are

extremely effective in preventing terrorist attacks. They require that you bypass the ordinary chain of command in order to carry them out. In Israel, for example, a brigade commander is authorized to give orders to Shin Bet (ISA) and Israeli Air Force (IAF) assets to execute such killings.

**1E.** The Perception of Reality is More Important than Reality. The media has tremendous influence in the GWOT. Perceptions determine domestic and international legitimacy, which affects a country's operational boundaries. We cannot "beat" the media. We have to join it.

**1F.** A Huge Gap Exists Between Expectations and Operational Capability. This is true regarding both the duration of an operation (with politicians wanting it to be short), and the desire that there be no casualties or innocent victims. Leaders need public support at the beginning of an operation. They tend to promise things that they cannot deliver.

**14.** (C) Eiland suggested that these lessons are well known, but that obstacles continue to hinder our ability to implement the right lessons learned. Governments need to do more to educate their populations about the nature of the conflict, and the need for a different attitude towards combating terrorism. Eiland stressed that governments need to look to the future and prepare for it. He suggested that future terrorist attacks will use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, and that there are civilian measures that need to be taken in order to deter such attacks. He also suggested that cyberterrorism will emerge as a significant threat and require international cooperation in order to prevail against it. He noted that Israel established an organization three years ago to consider how Israel can better defend itself against such attacks.

**15.** (C) Ambassador Crumpton made the following points in response:

**1A.** The current war on terrorism requires precise, fast and agile responses. It also requires intelligence that maps out the social, economic, cultural and environmental terrain. In a given environment, sometimes there are no noncombatants. The enemy is a fast, flexible "micro-target" that can have tremendous impact.

**1B.** All instruments of statecraft are affected. States need to adjust their instruments to their strategic targets. Formerly distinct political and military spheres are now blended. The private sector is increasingly the target, and should have a stake in helping to find solutions. States need to integrate policy planning and technology research and development organizations.

**1C.** Regarding technology, micro-UAVs will have tremendous applications. The U.S. has learned how to use UAVs to probe air defense systems.

**1D.** Regarding organizational structure, the U.S. is still working on how to optimize the Department of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence. The interagency process works best in the field. Organizations need to work together on a basis of trust.

**1E.** Regarding future threats, the "cyberworld" has become a form of terrorist safehaven and needs to be treated as such.

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ISA PRESENTATION ON PALESTINIAN TERROR ACTIVITY  
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**16.** (C) Israeli Security Agency (ISA; aka Shin Bet, Shabak) representative Szymon Rosenberg made the following points on Palestinian terrorist activity:

**1A.** The ISA is the "core agency" responsible for counterterrorism and integrating CT efforts.

**1B.** It takes only a few minutes for terrorists to hit cities in "green line" Israel from the Palestinian territories in the West Bank. Haifa and Tel Aviv are 36 and 21 kilometers, respectively, from the northern West Bank. Be'er Sheva is 18 kilometers from the southern West Bank. Jerusalem lies in between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank.

**1C.** The Gaza Strip is the center of the more sophisticated terrorist activity. In Gaza, HAMAS produces Qassam rockets and IEDs from materials smuggled in from Egypt. It launches the Qassams and mortar shells from Gaza. Judea is responsible for most of the suicide attacks against targets in "green line" Israel.

**1D.** The year 2002 was the worst year for terrorist attacks in Israel, with 183 Israelis killed in three months alone. Of the 183, 135 were killed in one month. Israel responded with Operation Defensive Shield and entered the West Bank. This,

and the establishment of a "buffer zone," resulted in a noticeable drop in successful terrorist attacks. The start of the cease-fire tahdiya in March 2005, and disengagement in August 2005 led to a further reduction in attacks and fatalities.

1E. HAMAS is responsible for most of the casualties over the past few years due to its efficiency, even while HAMAS honored the tahdiya. Under the cover of the tahdiya HAMAS is gathering its forces and building them up in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It has at least 1,000 people serving in its "army," and is supported by "tens of thousands" of activists. HAMAS also has a separate intelligence gathering structure. After Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip, HAMAS moved into posts abandoned by the IDF. It is storing anti-tank weapons at some of these hardened posts.

1F. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was the most lethal terrorist organization operating in Israel in 2005 -- it carried out five suicide bombing attacks that killed 21 Israelis. Among terrorist organizations, PIJ takes the lead in launching Qassam rocket attacks. PIJ is very dedicated, but works in small groups and has no political agenda of its own. It receives support from Iran.

1G. Fatah/Tanzim is a grouping of terrorist groups that includes the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades. These groups are isolated and only loosely connected with one another. Some of them receive their orders from Hizballah. They are not very efficient, and most of them stopped their activities in 2005.

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ISA PRESENTATION ON SUICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL  
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17. (C) Rosenberg then made a presentation on suicide attacks in Israel, highlighting the following points:

1A. There have been two main periods of suicide bombings in Israel's recent history: In 1993, as a result of the Oslo agreements, and in 2001, when the Intifada began. From 1995 to 2000, the Palestinian Authority cooperated with Israel to prevent attacks. The number of attacks increased significantly in 2002. The IDF's subsequent entrance into the West Bank reduced the attacks and fatalities.

1B. HAMAS and the PIJ are the most efficient terrorist organizations when it comes to executing attacks. Fatah joined in executing some suicide attacks in 2001 to gain public support and to challenge HAMAS. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- a secular terrorist organization -- also joined in the attacks. Martyrdom has become a household word among the Palestinians.

1C. There are several motivations behind the use of suicide bomb attacks. They are very effective, are often executed as a form of revenge, and often draw on the bomber's personal motives. Potential bombers and explosives are also available.

1D. Based on interviews with 15 suicide bombers who did not succeed in executing their missions, the ISA organizers of the study have determined the following about the bombers: Most of the bombers have been young bachelors, although some have been divorced women. Most bombers have some college or high school education. The typical bomber is young, single, not religiously fanatical, financially stable, better educated than the average Palestinian, lacking in prior terrorist experience, and submissive in character. Female bombers exhibited suicidal tendencies prior to their recruitment. A large percentage of the bombers come from refugee camps. The study's organizers are currently checking the information gleaned from the bombers against information they are getting from the bombers's families, captured terrorist leaders, and a test group. Israeli psychologists, social behaviorists and intelligence experts are involved in the study.

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INP PRESENTATION ON THE INP'S APPROACH TO TERRORISM  
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18. (C) Israeli National Police (INP) BGEN Shaike Horowitz presented on the INP approach to terrorism, making the following main points:

1A. INP is charged with "classic" police duties and maintaining public security. It operates out of seven districts nationwide. INP's police supervisor resides at headquarters in Jerusalem. District commanders are responsible for police activity in their own territory.

1B. Intelligence sharing between the ISA and the INP has improved dramatically over the last five years.

1C. The INP works closely with the citizenry, educating Israelis on the terrorist threat and organizing community

policing. The INP also coordinates with private security organizations.

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PRESENTATION ON MONEY TRANSFERS TO GAZA STRIP AND WEST BANK  
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19. MAJ Ilan Lochoff from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) briefed on money transfers to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (2004-5), making the following main points:

1A. Ninety percent of funds make their way to HAMAS through the dawa, HAMAS's financial and logistical support network. Funds sent to HAMAS's operational structure for activities is sent separately from funds sent to HAMAS through the dawa. HAMAS sends money into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank through the dawa and through people who are compartmentalized and unknown to HAMAS operatives, making it hard for Israeli security services to shut down the transfer channels.

1B. Other Palestinian terrorist organizations are learning from HAMAS how to transfer funds. The IDF believes that PIJ has taken several lessons from HAMAS.

1C. Palestinian terrorist organizations are currently using five methods (separately and in combination with one another) to transfer funds: money changers, traders, money telegraphing, couriers, and banks. The preference is to transfer money by people so that bank transfer fees can be avoided. PIJ tends to use Western Union and other money telegraphers. Fatah gets its money from Fatah/Hizballah using telegraph companies and money changers. The most common pattern for the flow of funds originating in Syria is through money changers or by telegraph from Damascus to Beirut to Egypt. The money is then brought by courier from Egypt into Gaza. The hawala method is also used, but is very difficult to understand and track. (NOTE: Developed in India, the hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system the exists and operates outside of, or parallel to, traditional banking or financial channels. END NOTE.)

1D. Of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations, HAMAS and the PIJ are the largest recipients of funds transferred into Israel and the Occupied Territories (OTs). In 2004, HAMAS received USD 10.5 million. In 2005, HAMAS received USD 16 million. Israel expects that the PIJ will take over the "lion's share" of funds sent by telegraph companies and money changers once HAMAS assumes control of the PA.

1E. HAMAS funds are collected in Saudi Arabia and in Europe. Israel does not know how these funds are then transferred to HAMAS headquarters in Syria and Lebanon. Israel does know how the funds get from Syria and Lebanon to the OTs. Syria orders funds for PIJ, but the money is transferred through Lebanon so that there are no fingerprints on it. Israel has not effectively hampered the transfer of funds into the OTs, and the Israeli security services do not have any idea of how money is transferred within the OTs once it has entered them. Overall, Israel's understanding of how money is transferred has improved since 2004.

1F. Israel's understanding of how funds are raised in Saudi Arabia is "comparatively dim." Israel understands that high-level HAMAS and PIJ representatives fly from Gaza to Saudi Arabia, where they meet traders and then return.

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PRESENTATION ON HIZBALLAH THREAT TO LEBANON AND REGION  
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110. (C) MAJ Itzhaki from IDF Intelligence spoke on Hizballah as a threat to Lebanon and regional stability, making the following main points:

1A. Hizballah is an arm of Iran with strategic reach. In Lebanon, it is training warriors for Iraq. Hizballah's "Unit 2800" is now using in Iraq the same tactics it developed from Hizballah's war with the IDF in Lebanon. Hizballah's "External Security Organization" collects information worldwide for Iran. Hizballah has cells in over 40 countries around the world, and bases in Europe and South America. It has established itself well in Lebanon over the last 20 years, and is now active in politics as well as in the terror arena. President Lahoud is a puppet of Syria. (NOTE: Itzhaki said he personally believes that Syria was behind the Hariri assassination, but that Hizballah played some role in it. He acknowledged that Israeli intelligence experts do not necessarily agree on either of these two points. END NOTE.)

1B. Hizballah sees many roles for itself: defending the interests of Shiites; serving as an agent of Syria and Iran; serving as a jihadist organization executing anti-American and anti-Israeli agendas; serving as a "protector" of Lebanon; and existing as an Arab/Islamic organization. A tension exists between the jihadist and Lebanese aspects of Hizballah's identity. This tension prevents Hizballah from making full use of its terrorist and military capabilities.

1C. Israel is particularly concerned about Hizballah's focus

on kidnapping Israeli soldiers.

1D. The French are thinking about how to build up the Lebanese Armed Forces. Israel agrees with this goal, but believes that it needs to be done in a way that gives the LAF capabilities that cannot be transferred to Hizballah.

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DISCUSSION OF TSWG AND REVIEW OF PRODUCTS  
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11. (C) Israeli Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Co-Chair IDF COL David Ovandia praised the TSWG as an excellent example of Israel's good relations with the U.S. He highlighted it as the main element of U.S.-Israel cooperation in the CT area that yields concrete products for use by both countries in the Global War on Terrorism. The TSWG is now operating under its second Memorandum of

SIPDIS  
Agreement, and has a USD 250 million budget that will sustain its work through 2015 and can be increased, as necessary. The TSWG meets two times each year (once each in Israel and the U.S.). The U.S. side is represented by the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security and Energy; and the Secret Service, CIA, FBI and FAA. To date, 85 projects have

SIPDIS  
been approved for research and development, and 45 of those projects are currently active. TSWG produces an average of 10 projects each year. Each project takes an average of one to two-and-half years to pass from conception to fielding. Ovandia noted that one project on latent fingerprint technology was used in investigating the murder of an Israeli Knesset member.

12. (C) Ovandia noted two other programs that TSWG sponsors:

(A) the MARKER program, a joint IED Task Force that has produced equipment currently fielded by U.S. forces in Iraq.

(B) a new cooperative venture with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), of which TSWG is the program manager. This is a USD 36 million program with a lifespan of four years. It is focusing on omnidirectional sniper detection and labs that will be used to counter improvised explosive devices and detect and neutralize explosives.

13. (U) S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Henry Crumpton cleared this cable.

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JONES